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SIMULATED PACKING AND CRACKING
JEFFREY S. BUZAS AND GREGORY S. WARRINGTON
ABSTRACT. We introduce simulated packing and cracking as a technique for evaluating partisan-
gerrymandering measures. We apply it to historical congressional and legislative elections to evalu-
ate four measures: partisan bias, declination, efficiency gap, and mean-median difference. While the
efficiency gap recognizes simulated packing and cracking in a completely predictable manner (a fact
that follows immediately from the efficiency gap’s definition) and the declination does a very good
job of recording simulated packing and cracking, we conclude that both of the other two measures
record it poorly. This deficiency is especially notable given the frequent use of such measures in
outlier analyses.
1. INTRODUCTION
A gerrymander is a district plan that (dis)advantages a particular group. Commonly, the group
in question is a racial minority, a group of incumbents or a political party. In this article we will
focus on cases in which the group is a political party — partisan gerrymanders. The clean sepa-
ration between the various types of gerrymanders given above is frequently not clear in practice.
For example, in Radogno v. Illinois State Board of Elections,1 the 2011 legislative district plan
was challenged (unsuccessfully) as both a racial and a partisan gerrymander. Similarly, in Cooper
v. Harris, the 2011 North Carolina congressional plan was challenged as a racial gerrymander;2
the resulting remedial plan was then challenged (unsuccessfully) on remand as a partisan gerry-
mander.3 Regardless, we are still able to ask to what extent a district plan qualifies as a partisan
gerrymander, whether or not it might qualify as a gerrymander of another type as well. For the
remainder of the article, unless otherwise noted, by “gerrymander” we mean “partisan gerryman-
der”.
This article is predicated on the notion that quantifying gerrymanders is an important task. A
proper discussion justifying this claim is too lengthy for this introduction, so we defer it to Section
2. For similar reasons, we defer an exploration of the various methods for quantifying gerryman-
ders to Section 3. For this introduction, we restrict ourselves to observing that two general cat-
egories of gerrymandering measures have been proposed: “compactness measures” evaluate the
shapes of districts while “partisan-asymmetry measures” evaluate the distribution of votes among
districts.4 The main goals of this article are to
(1) Introduce a new technique, simulated packing and cracking (SPC),5 for evaluating the abil-
ity of the partisan-asymmetry measures to detect gerrymandering and
1Radogno v. Illinois State Board of Elections, NO. 1:11-cv-04884 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2011).
2Cooper v. Harris, No. 15-1262 (S. Ct.).
3Cooper v. Harris, No. 16-166 (S. Ct.).
4The utilization of computer-generated district plans is symbiotic with both classes of measures. The scant attention
we pay to computer-generated plans should not be read as an attempt to minimize their importance.
5An early version of this technique applied to the declination only appears in our preprint (Buzas & Warrington,
2017).
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(2) Apply SPC to four gerrymandering measures using a large collection of historical elections
in order to evaluate their ability to record the primary signal of partisan gerrymandering.
Comparisons and evaluations of partisan-asymmetry measures already exist in the literature. We
mention some recent instances. In (Stephanopoulos & McGhee, May 2018) the authors explore
the extent to which several measures adhere to the Efficiency Principle, which is a monotonicity
principle relating partisan advantage, seats and votes.6 In (Best et al., 2017), the authors evaluate
a number of measures on two specific elections based primarily on their stability under uniform
vote swings. A similar approach to the prior studies is taken in (Nagle, December 2015, 2017),
although with different theoretical considerations and different measures considered. The authors
in (Campisi et al., Dec 2019) focus on the ability of a specific measure to deal with unequal turnout
among districts. In (Warrington, 2019), the author considers how various measures evaluate a
number of hypothetical elections. Finally, in (Katz et al., 2020), the authors evaluate measures
based on what they contend are universal assumptions.
Unfortunately, there is essentially no agreement among the above analyses as to which measures
are the most effective. For some situations, this appears not to matter. For instance, in (Warshaw &
Stephanopoulos, 2019) the authors attempt to quantify the political effects of gerrymandering. For
the four measures they consider — the same four we consider here — there is general agreement
as to the small but measurable effects as averaged over a population of plans. Whatever their
strengths and weaknesses, each of the four measures comes to the same general conclusion when
considering plans en masse. On the other hand, there are many examples of specific elections for
which specific measures disagree strongly (see, e.g., (Warrington, 2019; Best et al., 2017)). The
existence of such discrepancies is an important matter to consider more carefully.
Measures have been frequently used to evaluate specific plans, most notably as part of the “(ex-
treme) outlier approach” (see, e.g., (Duchin, 2018; Counsel for Appellees Common Cause, et al,
2019). As we discuss in Section 2, we believe it likely that partisan-asymmetry measures will
continue to be applied in the future in situations in which the efficacy of individual (as opposed to
aggregate) measures really does matter. This article is an attempt to provide additional evidence
regarding which of the individual measures should or should not be used in such contexts. In
short, we propose the following criterion as one that should be satisfied by any useful partisan-
gerrymandering measure:
SPC Criterion: A partisan-gerrymandering measure should reliably detect packing and crack-
ing due to one or more applications of SPC.
The organization of this article is as follows. We begin, in Section 2, with arguments for why it is
worthwhile to quantify partisan gerrymandering. Simulated packing and cracking, which consists
simply in modifying the vote distributions of an election in a manner consistent with how someone
aiming to create a gerrymandering would do so, is introduced in Section 3.3. An analysis of the
various partisan-asymmetry measures appears in Section 4. We close in Sections 5 and 6 with a
discussion and summary of our results; we conclude, in part, that the mean-median difference and
partisan bias do a very poor job of recognizing the signal of SPC.
6The efficiency principle is closely related to the SPC Criterion introduced below; see (Veomett, 2018) for further
explorations of the efficiency principle in the context of the efficiency gap.
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2. WHY SHOULD GERRYMANDERS BE QUANTIFIED?
We divide the reasons for attempting to identify gerrymanders into three broad categories. These
categories are followed by a brief introduction to the “outlier method”, a natural place to apply
partisan-asymmetry measures.
2.1. Litigation. The possible utility of quantitative social science in partisan-gerrymandering lit-
igation was crystallized in Davis v. Bandemer,7 which established that district plans could be
challenged as partisan gerrymanders. Quantitative tools were incorporated in successive cases
in different ways. For example, in Whitford v. Gill,8 the plaintiffs suggested that raw values of
the efficiency gap measure be used as a means of demonstrating discriminatory effect (Peter G.
Earle and J. Gerald Hebert and Ruth Greenwood and Annabelle Harless and Danielle Lang and
Michele Odorizzi and Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos and Douglas M. Poland, 2016). In Rucho v.
League of Women Voters,9 three different measures (partisan bias, mean-median difference, and
the efficiency gap) were used to compare the challenged plan to computer-generated plans in order
to support vote dilution claims. Ultimately, the US Supreme Court decided in Rucho v. Com-
mon Cause that partisan gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable, thereby closing off the federal
courts to partisan gerrymandering claims. However, the role of this aspect of quantitative social
science in such cases in state courts is still undetermined.
In League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,10 the plaintiffs
used the efficiency gap measure in a manner similar to how it was used in Whitford v. Gill, showing
the historical plan as an outlier in the context of historical plans. Similarly, in Common Cause v.
Lewis,11 computer simulations and the efficiency gap were combined by the plaintiffs in a very
similar manner to that used in Rucho v. Common Cause.
We expect quantitative measures to continue to be used in future state cases as one way of
substantiating the effects of a given district plan. Exactly how they will be used remains unclear,
and indeed, they may be used in different states in different ways. In some situations it might make
sense to use measures to compare a challenged plan to historical plans while in other situations the
use of computer-generated plans may be preferable. The importance of such measures in a given
case may range from non-existent to central. And for the most extreme gerrymanders, there may
be unanimity among all measures considered. In less clear-cut examples the different measures
may give very different answers. Regardless, the bar for measures used in the legal context is
potentially very high as the ramifications of false positives/negatives may be significant.
2.2. Evaluating actual and proposed plans. Generally speaking, partisan asymmetry measures
can be used to flag plans as potentially unfair (although one must expect false positives) or fair
(although one must expect false negatives). These measures could be applied to maps proposed by
a redistricting committee or to maps proposed by citizens. Functionality in this vein is central to
7478 U.S. 109 (1986)
8Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421, F. Supp. 3d (2016).
9League of Women Voters of North Carolina v. Rucho, No. 1:16-CV-1164-textscWO-JEP, 2016.
10Petitioner’s Opening Brief (Public Verions), No. 159 MM 2017, Jan. 15, 2018. Available
at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/LWV_v_PA_
Petitioners-Brief.pdf.
11Complaint, Wake County Superior Court, No. 18-cv-014001, https://www.
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/Common-Cause-v.
-Lewis-Complaint-FILED-Nov-13-2018%20%281%29.pdf.
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the purpose of PlanScore (Migurski et al., 2018). Such measures could be useful in citizen-focused
redistricting tools such as Districtr (Hully et al., 2019) as well. In fact, a number of measures are
now available in Dave’s Redistricting App (Bradlee et al., 2020).
2.3. Education and research. The final category is a catch-all for uses that are essentially inde-
pendent of the redistricting process. The media may want to use compactness measures to illustrate
in a memorable way to their readers the districts with the most contorted boundaries (see, for exam-
ple, (Ingraham, May 15, 2014)). Researchers may wish to study the evolution of gerrymandering
over the decades or to measure the impacts of gerrymandering on political parties such as in (War-
shaw & Stephanopoulos, 2019). The characteristics needed of the measures will vary widely in
this category of uses.
2.4. The outlier method. The partisan-asymmetry measures we consider in this article all asso-
ciate a single number to a given election/district plan. There are two basic approaches to interpret-
ing the resulting number. The first, most natural approach is to consider its value in absolute terms.
For example, (McGhee & Stephanopoulos, 2015) proposed that in a legal test for gerrymanders, a
threshold of 0.08 be set for the efficiency gap for state house plans: plans with an efficiency gap
greater than 0.08 in absolute value would be considered gerrymandered. While appealing in its
simplicity, this approach leaves no room for confounding factors such as the geographic distribu-
tion of voters.
In several recent cases that have been litigated (for example, (League, 2018)), the plaintiffs have
focused on how the score on the plan of interest compares to the distribution of scores arising
from computer-generated plans. The idea in this approach is that the computer-generated plans
incorporate the realities that mapmakers have to take into account when drawing maps. If, say, the
distribution of efficiency gap scores is a bell curve with 95 percent of the values between -0.12 and
0.12, then a score of 0.20 is an “extreme outlier”; one would expect to see such a large value arise
from a computer-generated plan only rarely. From this point of view, the efficiency gap serves as
a marker for putative gerrymanders in the same way that contorted boundaries do. The logic of
this approach depends on the relative magnitude of the efficiency gap score (or whatever measure
is being used) being a good proxy for the severity of the gerrymander. In other words, high values
of measure must be strongly correlated with severe gerrymanders. As we show in Section 4, two
of the measures we consider fail this requirement to the extent that they fail to record SPC.
3. HOW CAN GERRYMANDERS BE QUANTIFIED?
3.1. Partisan-asymmetry measures studied. We focus in this article on four measures that have
been proposed to quantify partisan gerrymandering:
(1) (Partisan) bias (Gelman & King, 1994), Bias, compares the predicted share of seats a party
would win if they won fifty percent of the statewide vote (determined using a uniform vote
swing) to fifty percent of the seats.
(2) Declination (Warrington, Mar 2018), Dec, is a measure of differential responsiveness de-
rived from the average winning margins of each party and the fractions of seats won.
(3) Efficiency gap (McGhee, 2014; McGhee & Stephanopoulos, 2015), EG, measures the rel-
ative number of votes “wasted” by each party. In this article we will assume there is equal
turnout in each district.
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(4) Mean-median difference (McDonald & Best, Dec 2015), MM, a standard technique for
evaluating the asymmetry of a distribution, encodes the difference between the mean of the
Democratic vote shares among districts and the corresponding median value.
Each measure associates a number to an N -district election, defined as a weakly increasing se-
quence ` = (`1, `2, . . . , `N) in which `i indicates the Democratic fraction of the two-party (legisla-
tive) vote in district i. Partisan bias and the efficiency gap associate a number between -1/2 and 1/2
while the other two measures output a number between -1 and 1. It is important to note that the
measures we consider invariably output different values from election to election; the “fairness” of
each district plan is filtered through the lens of individual elections.
Our choice of measures to consider is guided by two considerations. The efficiency gap, mean-
median difference, and partisan bias are the most widely used and discussed of the measures
that have been proposed. For example, these are the three measures implemented by PlanScore
(Migurski et al., 2018). We include the declination along with these three because, as discussed in
(Warrington, 2019), we believe it to be at least as efficacious, if not more so, than these other three
measures.12
Each of the measures listed above has either minor or major variants that could be considered
as well. The partisan bias measure considers the seats allocated to each party at the 50%-vote
level on the seats-votes curve. One variant compares the seats that would be won by each party
at the observed statewide vote level V as compared to 1 − V (see (Katz et al., 2020) for a more
extensive description of these interconnected notions). In (Warrington, Mar 2018), a minor variant
of the declination is introduced with the goal of attaining a muted response in elections in which
one party wins the vast majority of the seats. The original version of the efficiency gap, defined
in terms of wasted votes applies to elections in which turnout is allowed to vary among districts.
See (Veomett, 2018) for a discussion of some of the ramifications of assuming equal turnout for
the efficiency gap as we do. See (Nagle, December 2015) for a discussion of the mean-median
difference and some related measures.
As mentioned in the introduction, partisan-asymmetry measures are not the only approach
to identifying possible gerrymanders. Historically, partisan gerrymanders have been recognized
through their contorted geographical boundaries. However, contorted shapes, while often arising
as a symptom of gerrymandering, are by no means a necessary characteristic. So while contorted
shapes may raise red flags, their absence is not particularly informative. Nonetheless, compactness
metrics continue to play a very important role in identifying gerrymanders. They can be used to
support allegations of intent by, for example, showing that the challenged plan is significantly less
compact than expected based on a suite of computer-generated plans. Perhaps more crucially, the
creation of computer-generated district plans requires some means of filtering out plans in which
one or more districts is sufficiently contorted — a purpose for which compactness metrics are well
suited.
The reason compactness measures are not a reliable means of detecting gerrymanders is that
gerrymanders are created by intentionally allocating the voters of each party to the various districts
12To our knowledge, these are the only partisan-asymmetry measures that have played a role in litigation, although
for the declination it is only through expert witness testimony in the federal district court cases in Michigan (League
of Women Voters of Michigan v. Benson, Case 2:17-cv-14148-ELC-DPH-GJQ) and Ohio (Ohio A. Philip Randolph
Institute v. Householder, Case: 1:18-cv-00357-TSB-KNM-MHW, Plaintiff’s Proposed Finding of Fact, IV.A.5.); the
others feature in multiple additional cases.
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FIGURE 1. Symmetric vote distributions for fair elections with equally popular parties.
FIGURE 2. (A) Repeat of election from Figure 1.A. (B) Illustration of packing of
the distribution from (A) for a gain of two Republican seats. (C) Illustration of
cracking of the distribution from (A) for a gain of two Republican seats.
in an advantageous manner. This may require contorted district boundaries or may not. We now
discuss the precise manner by which map drawers create advantageous allocations of voters.
3.2. Packing and cracking. The “packing and cracking” used to allocate voters advantageously
works as follows. Suppose the Democrats are in control of redistricting and the Republicans are
poised to win district X . In packing, Republicans are moved from X to other districts in which
the Republicans already have enough strength to win. These votes are effectively wasted in the
new districts while district X falls to the Democrats. Cracking works similarly, except now the
Republicans are spread among districts that they have no chance of winning. Once the cracking
occurs, the recipient districts are lost by the Republicans by smaller margins, but they are still lost
by them.
In discussing packing and cracking, it is helpful to be able to visualize how the voters of each
party are distributed among districts. We visualize the vector of district-level Democratic vote
shares, `, by plotting a point vi = (i/N − 1/2N, `i) for each i. Figure 1 illustrates plots of ` for
three hypothetical elections. Figure 2 illustrates the effect of pro-Republican packing and cracking
on the vote distribution illustrated in Figure 1.A. Note that in Figure 2.B, Republicans have won
two additional districts and the Democratic majorities in the three districts they win have increased
slightly; in Figure 2.C, the Republican majorities are where votes get redistributed to.
While packing and cracking is the general technique by which gerrymanders are created, in
reality there will be ambiguities and unknowables. For example, it is unreasonable to suppose
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that there is a single, well-defined “starting” plan to which the packing and cracking are applied.
Certainly the map drawers may use the plan currently in use as a starting point, but they may work
from other plans as well. Additionally, there is no reason to suppose that the final map is drawn all
in one step. A much more natural approach is to iteratively progress towards a map that balances
reward with the map drawers’ tolerance for risk and other priorities.13
3.3. Simulated packing and cracking. In order to validate the measures described in Section
3.1, we will examine how perturbations of a vote distribution by packing and/or cracking affect
the value of each individual measure. The technique we will use is that of simulated packing and
cracking (SPC). In short, we manually modify a vote distribution by packing or cracking so as to
flip a single district from one party to the other. There are four possible composite choices: whether
we are packing or cracking and whether it is the Republicans or the Democrats who are in charge
of the gerrymander. In reality, the votes from the flipped district could be distributed among other
districts by a combination of packing and cracking, but we do not attempt to model this. We focus
in the below explanation on the case in which the Republicans are flipping a single Democratic
district to Republican control using cracking. The other three cases are treated similarly.
In practice, the details of a gerrymander will depend on many factors. One such factor will be
the geography of the state. If a given district is being cracked so as to turn it from a Democratic
district to a Republican district, the surplus Democratic voters will have to be allocated to adjacent
districts.14 Of course, this process can be iterated by swapping other Democratic voters for Re-
publican voters in second-order neighbors of the original district. Nonetheless, there are obvious
geographic constraints that may be significant. But the measures we consider in this article should,
if they are effective measures, record this particular packing and cracking regardless of whether or
not it geographically feasible. Said another way, while the vote distributions we work with in this
article are taken from historical election data (and hence derive from underlying physical district
plans), mathematically the geography is irrelevant to the questions we ask.
Another factor that affects the details of a gerrymander is how risk averse the gerrymandering
party is. For example, if the Democrats wish to maximize their potential gain in seats (albeit at
a high risk of the plan backfiring) they can crack Republican districts by creating districts that
are (say) 49% Republican. On the other hand, if the Democrats feel the political winds will be
against them in the upcoming decade, they may prefer to pack Republicans into districts so that
the Democratic districts are no more than (say) 35% Republican.
As stated above, SPC amounts to flipping one district by redistributing some of the voters from
the given district. In the default case, we move some of the Democratic voters out from a district so
that the Republicans win that district without giving up their hold on any other. To operationalize
this idea, we make the following conventions for how the gerrymander is achieved. It is important
to note that in some situations it will not be possible to follow the conventions. In such situations,
the attempted application of SPC fails.
(1) The district selected to be flipped is the Democratic district that is won by the narrowest
margin.
(2) The gerrymander does not create any new Republican-majority districts with a Demo-
cratic vote fraction of greater than 0.45. We choose this value on the basis that a 45–55
13See, for example, the sequence of maps proposed for the North Carolina Superior Court, https://www.
ncleg.gov/Legislation/SupplementalDocs/2017/H717maps/H717maps.
14We assume in this article that each district has the same number of total votes.
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split is frequently considered the threshold for a race to be competitive (see, for exam-
ple, (Abramowitz et al., 2006)). Any Republican-majority district with a Democratic vote
fraction higher than this before the cracking is allowed to remain at such a level.
(3) The modified Democratic vote fraction in the flipped district is set to be 0.45.
(4) The Democratic votes shifted from the flipped district are distributed evenly among the
Republican-majority districts with a Democratic vote fraction of at most 0.45. In order
to avoid violating the Convention 2, this process may need to be iterated (see Example 1
below).
In order to illustrate the method in practice we present the following example of flipping a dis-
trict from Democratic to Republican by cracking. While we use hypothetical data in this example,
all subsequent applications of simulated packing and cracking in this article begin with vote distri-
butions from actual elections.
Example 1. Consider a 10-district election
` = (0.37, 0.40, 0.43, 0.46, 0.60, 0.63, 0.66, 0.69, 0.72, 0.75).
By Convention 1, we flip the fifth district. By Convention 3, the Democratic vote fraction in this
district gets changes from 0.6 to 0.45. In order to maintain the same statewide Democratic vote
fraction, there must be a net increase of 0.15 among the first three districts (note that the fourth
district is not included since its Democratic vote fraction already exceeds 0.45). Convention 4
instructs us to distribute these Democratic votes evenly among the three districts. The resulting
vote distribution is
(0.42, 0.45, 0.48, 0.46, 0.45, 0.63, 0.66, 0.69, 0.72, 0.75).
However, following Convention 4, we iterate the process by redistributing the excess fraction of
0.03 = 0.48 − 0.45 from the third district evenly among the first two districts. Since the second
district is already at a value of 0.45, the amount is entirely distributed to the first district. This
yields a final vote distribution of
`∗ = (0.45, 0.45, 0.45, 0.46, 0.45, 0.63, 0.66, 0.69, 0.72, 0.75).
4. EVALUATIONS OF MEASURES USING SPC APPLIED TO HISTORICAL ELECTIONS
We now examine how the values of the measures introduced in Section 3.1 change in response
to simulated packing and cracking.
The starting vote distributions, to which SPC will be applied, are taken from two different col-
lections of historical election data, both described in detail in (Warrington, Mar 2018). The first
collection consists of congressional elections since 1972 while the second collection consists of
elections to state lower-house legislatures since 1972.15 For each such election we attempt the four
possible types of SPC: packing in favor of the Democrats, packing in the favor of the Republicans,
cracking in favor of the Democrats and cracking in favor of the Republicans.
Our first exploration is of how the value of each measure changes under a single application of
SPC. Ideally, flipping a single seat from (say) Democratic to Republican would lead to a consistent
increase in the measure value, regardless of the starting distribution. Empirically, however, there
is an inverse dependency on the number of districts N .
15A multilevel model (described in (Warrington, Mar 2018)) is used to impute the Democratic vote fraction for
uncontested elections.
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FIGURE 3. Plot of change in measures (each scaled by N ) due to SPC. For each
subplot, the 961 red squares represent single applications of pro-Republican SPC
to House elections since 1972; the 939 blue circles represent single applications
of pro-Democratic SPC. Measures depicted are partisan bias (A), declination (B),
efficiency gap (C) and mean-median difference (D). Horizontal and vertical coordi-
nates have been jittered to reduce overlap.
In fact, it follows from its definition that flipping a single seat for an N -district election will lead
to a change of exactly 1/N in the efficiency gap. While the partisan bias need not change by exactly
1/N , it will change by a multiple of 1/N . Empirical data (see (Buzas & Warrington, 2017) as well
as the figures in this article) suggest that the declination changes by approximately 1/2N . Given
these relationships, we have chosen to focus on the change in value of each measure multiplied by
the number of districts, N . This exactly removes the dependency on N for the efficiency gap and
partisan bias and appears to approximately remove it for the declination.
Figure 3 displays four plots, one for each of the measures we consider. Each point in each
plot corresponds to a single successful (see below) application of SPC to one of the elections in
our data set. Red squares denote pro-Republican packing/cracking while blue circles denote pro-
Democratic packing/cracking. Packing versus cracking are not distinguished in Figure 3. The
horizontal coordinate of each SPC application is given by the number of districts N in the under-
lying plan to which SPC is being applied; the vertical coordinate is the change in measure, scaled
by N .
Table 1 contains details about the data of Figure 3 as well as for the analogous figure (not shown)
for legislative elections.
The instances of SPC plotted in Figure 3 and the subsequent figures are restricted in two ways.
First, we require that each party win at least one seat both before and after the packing/cracking.
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TABLE 1. Success of each measure at moving the expected direction under one
application of SPC for House and state-legislative elections.
pro-Democratic pro-Republican
Fraction correct Decrease Increase Decrease Increase
Bias 0.531 508 431 460 501
Dec 0.999 939 0 2 959
H
ou
se
EG 1.000 939 0 0 961
MM 0.455 422 517 518 443
Bias 0.340 538 752 951 338
Dec 1.000 1290 0 0 1289
EG 1.000 1290 0 0 1289
L
eg
is
la
tiv
e
MM 0.308 428 862 923 366
This is necessary for the declination of each distribution to be defined. Second, we require that
there be at least three districts into which to distribute the votes from the flipped district for each
application of SPC. For example, when a seat is being flipped from Democratic to Republican
by cracking, we require that there be at least three Republican seats in the original distribution.
Together, these restrictions exclude all elections from states in which there are four or fewer con-
gressional districts. In the current apportionment cycle there are 21 such states:
AK, AR, DE, HI, IA, ID, KS, ME, MS, MT, ND,
NE, NH, NM, NV, RI, SD, UT, VT, WV, and WY.
There were 676 state-year pairs in which there were at least five Congressional districts and each
party won at least one seat. Given the four possible combinations of packing/cracking and pro-
Republican/pro-Democratic, this offers 2704 possible applications of SPC. However, for 804 of
these, either there was not enough room for the chosen packing/cracking or one of the constraints
was not satisfied. Remaining are the 1900 simulations illustrated in each subplot of Figure 3.
Our second exploration is of how the measures change under the flipping of multiple seats.
Figure 4 considers the net change after three such flips.16 Axes are as in Figure 3. In Figure 5,
we consider the incremental effects. For example, in Figure 5.B we show one line plot for each
legislative election considered.17 For each election, we successively apply SPC, evaluating the
resulting vote distribution under the declination after each application. Each election results in
up to four line plots, one for each of the four possible combinations of packing/cracking and pro-
Republican/pro-Democratic. In subplot B, the pro-Republican line plots are increasing and the
pro-Democratic ones are decreasing. This indicates that larger changes in the declination generally
correspond to greater numbers of flipped seats under SPC.
Our third exploration looks at the extent to which our results depend on the implementation
choices we have made for SPC. Two fundamental choices we make are how close to parity we allow
16We have chosen three for the congressional elections as representative of what might happen in a severe gerry-
mander such as in North Carolina.
17We have only shown the line plots for a sample of 12 legislative elections (about 2% of the data set) in order to
avoid clutter.
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FIGURE 4. Plot of net change in measures (each scaled by N ) due to three appli-
cations of SPC. For each subplot, the 540 red squares represent triple applications
of pro-Republican SPC to House elections since 1972; the 529 blue circles rep-
resent single applications of pro-Democratic SPC. Measures depicted are partisan
bias (A), declination (B), efficiency gap (C) and mean-median difference (D). Hor-
izontal and vertical coordinates have been jittered to reduce overlap.
a modified district to get and how votes from the flipped district are reallocated to the receiving
districts. Below we list the alternatives we consider (phrased relative to a pro-Republican SPC).
(1) Maximum competitiveness: The maximum Democratic vote share allowed in a modified
district.
(a) 0.45: Default.
(b) 0.40: Increased risk aversion relative to default.
(c) 0.49: Decreased risk aversion relative to default.
(2) Algorithm: How voters from the flipped district are reallocated to the receiving districts.
(a) Even: Default. Distribute new Democratic voters evenly among the receiving districts,
iterating as necessary.
(b) Equalization: Distribute new Democratic voters preferentially to the least Democratic
districts. This has the effect of equalizing Democratic support among the Republican
districts (when cracking) or among Democratic districts (when packing).
(c) Concentration: Distribute new Democratic voters preferentially to the most Demo-
cratic districts. This has the effect of accentuating differences in Democratic support
among the Republican districts (when cracking) or among Democratic districts (when
packing).
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FIGURE 5. Plot of incremental change in measures under successive applications
of SPC. Measures depicted are partisan bias (A), declination (B), efficiency gap (C)
and mean-median difference (D).
When flipping a single seat, each of the nine combinations of choices generates data analogous to
that illustrated in Figure 3. As the numerous individual subplots would be difficult to compare even
qualitatively, we summarize the results as a scatter plot in Figure 6.A. This figure contains 36 data
points, one for each of the nine SPC variations paired with each of the four measures we consider.18
The horizontal axis records the fraction of time the measure changes in the expected direction while
the vertical axis records the variation in the change, appropriately scaled. Figure 6.B contains
analogous data restricted to elections where each party enjoys at least 45% of the vote. We now
describe in more detail how these summary statistics are computed.
To determine the horizontal coordinate for a given SPC-measure pair, we determine the frac-
tion of successful applications of that variation of SPC that move the associated measure in the
expected direction: Under a pro-Republican packing/cracking, we expect a given measure value to
increase in value (i.e., become more positive if initially positive and less negative if initially nega-
tive). For example, for the default SPC variation used for Figure 3.C, the efficiency gap increases
for every single pro-Republican packing/cracking and decreases for every single pro-Democratic
packing/cracking. This pair has a horizontal coordinate of 1 in Figure 6. For the declination, the
fact that in Figure 3.B, 959 out of 961 of the red squares lie strictly above 0 while all 939 of the
blue circles lie strictly below 0, yields a horizontal coordinate of 0.999.
The vertical coordinate quantifies the consistency of each measure in recording packing and
cracking, as measured by the coefcient of variation, defined as the sample standard deviation of the
18We are not distinguishing in this figure between pro-Republican/pro-Democratic or packing/cracking
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FIGURE 6. Fraction of elections for which each measure moves in the expected di-
rection plotted against the uniformity of the change (as measured by the coefficient
of variation) for each variation of the standard SPC algorithm. The sizes of mark-
ers denote the corresponding maximum competitiveness as described in the text;
the redistribution algorithm used is not displayed graphically. Subplot (A) is based
on all House elections in our data set, subplot (B) on those “competitive” ones for
which the statewide Democratic votes was between 45% and 55%.
measure divided by its sample mean.19 Dividing by the sample mean accounts for the fact that the
scalings of the original measures are essentially arbitrary; this normalization allows us to compare
them on an equal footing. As an example, consider again the declination as shown in Figure 3.B.
The standard deviation of the 1900 data points is 0.428 while the corresponding mean is 2.36. The
ratio of 0.428/2.36 yields a coefficient of variation of 0.181.
In Figure 6, color and shape denote measure as indicated in legend. Small, medium and large
markers denote maximum competitiveness of 0.40, 0.45 and 0.49, respectively. The redistribution
algorithm used is not indicated graphically.
5. DISCUSSION
Our starting point for this article is that any effective partisan-asymmetry measure should be able
to consistently recognize packing and cracking, the accepted means by which partisan-gerrymanders
are created.20 As a proxy for recognizing packing and cracking in historical election data, which
can be difficult to separate from social and political factors, we have proposed the SPC Crite-
rion. Below we explain our understanding of why the measures behave as shown in this article
under applications of SPC. For clarity of exposition, we describe the behavior in the context of
pro-Republican applications of SPC.
Efficiency gap: As illustrated in Figures 3, 4 and 5, the efficiency gap captures each seat flip with
a change of exactly 1/N . It is important to note here that this depends in part on our assumption of
equal turnout in each district: As shown in (McGhee, 2014), if V denotes the statewide Democratic
vote share and S denotes the fraction of Democratic seats, then the value of the efficiency gap
reduces to (S − 1/2)− 2(V − 1/2). Since SPC does not change V , flipping a seat (i.e., changing
19In these computations, we multiply the differences for all the pro-Democratic applications of SPC by −1 so that
the expected differences are always positive.
20For example, “For packing and cracking are the ways in which a partisan gerrymander dilutes votes,” Gill v.
Whitford, concurring opinion (J. Kagan), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/pdf/16-1161.pdf,
page 4.
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S by ±1/N ) changes the efficiency gap in a completely predictable manner. This is arguably the
ideal outcome. If turnout is not assumed to be equal and one computes the efficiency gap according
to the more general notion of wasted votes (see (McGhee, 2014)), its value will likely change by
amounts close to 1/N , but not exactly equal to it.
Because of the strict relationship among seats, votes and the value of the (equal-turnout) ef-
ficiency gap, SPC does not actually provide any new insights in this case. However, we have
included the efficiency gap in this article for two reasons. First, it has been the most widely used
measure over the past several years. Second, its behavior illustrates any arguably ideal way a mea-
sure should behave under SPC. It therefore serves as a useful benchmark for the evaluating the
performance of the other measures considered.
Declination: As proved in Theorem 1 of (Warrington, Mar 2018), the declination will increase
under a pro-Republican application of SPC as long as the modified Democratic vote fraction in
the flipped district is greater than or equal to the average Democratic vote fraction in the other
Republican districts. That this is the case follows from the geometric definition of the declination
as an angle along with three facts. First, that we are flipping the most competitive (Democratic)
district.21 Second, that the average Democratic vote share will stay the same or increase in both the
Democratic districts and the Republican districts.22 And third, that the Republicans gain one seat.
The declination does a very good job of responding to SPC. In Figures 3 and 4 it shows a almost
entirely clean separation between positive values for pro-Republican packing/cracking and nega-
tive values for pro-Democratic packing/cracking (note the two negative values for pro-Republican
packing/cracking in Figure 3.B). And when change in declination is considered incrementally as
in Figure 5, we see that it increases in a regular manner for the sample shown23 although at slightly
different rates for different individual elections.
Having discussed both declination and efficiency gap individually, it is useful to contrast their
behaviour. The efficiency gap changes by a fixed, predictable amount for every seat flip. The
declination changes consistently, but with some variation. Delving into the pros and cons of each
measure is beyond the scope of this article. However, we do wish to point out that an argument can
be made that a measure should change by varying amounts depending on the particulars of how the
vote distribution has changed. As just one example, consider two applications of pro-Republican
SPC that differ only in whether the redistributed voters are packed or cracked. Under cracking,
these voters would be redistributed to Republican districts, thereby making these districts slightly
more Democratic. If these districts are already reasonably competitive, the addition of Democratic
voters might tip them over into being highly competitive. In such a scenario, it might be better
for the Republicans to redistribute these voters through packing to districts that are already safely
Democratic. The latter case could lead to a “safer” gerrymander that could reasonably be measured
as being more advantageous to the Republicans than the former version.
Partisan bias: The partisan bias measure compares the seat share each party would earn were
the statewide vote shifted to 50%. Suppose, as above that the statewide Democratic vote share is
V . The value of partisan bias is then determined by the fraction of districts with a Democratic
vote share of less than V . When SPC is applied, the change in bias is therefore determined by the
21If we flip the second-most competitive district, the fraction of House elections for which the declination moves
in the expected direction decreases from 0.999 (see Table 1) to 0.989.
22This is true regardless of whether voters in the flipped district are redistributed through packing or through
cracking.
23This is true qualitatively for the entire data set as well.
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fraction of districts whose Democratic vote share switches from one side of V to the other. If the
state is evenly split, the flipped district will typically flip from above V to below, increasing the bias
by 1/N . The increased likelihood of this with decreased values of the maximum competitiveness
can be seen in Figure 6.A. In this figure, the sizes of the squares indicate the final Democratic vote
share in the flipped district. Each of the large, medium and small squares are cleanly separated
from the other two groups. Furthermore, the smaller the square (and hence the greater the swing
in the flipped-district Democratic vote share) the more likely the partisan bias increases.
The redistribution of votes can cause other districts to move back across V in the opposite
direction. This accounts for the applications of SPC illustrated in Figure 3.A that move in the
wrong direction. As a concrete example consider a seven-district election with Democratic votes
shares of 0.203, 0.294, 0.347, 0.394, 0.417, 0.607 and 0.672. The statewide average is 0.419.
When the statewide average is shifted to 0.5, the number of Republican districts remains at five.
Under a pro-Republican, cracking application of SPC, the original district values become 0.234,
0.325, 0.378, 0.425, 0.448, 0.450 and 0.672. As the statewide average doesn’t change, only three
Republican districts remain when the statewide average is shifted to 0.5, leading to a change in
partisan bias of −2/7.
Mean-median difference: When SPC is applied to a vote distribution, the statewide Democratic
vote share does not change. Any change to the measure therefore results from a new value for the
Democratic vote share in the median district. While its value often increases as expected, as seen
in Figure 3.D it frequently decreases, though only by small amounts. This can happen when some
of the Democratic voters moved out of the flipped district are redistributed to the median district.
The same figure also shows high variability when it does move in the expected direction.
Figure 6 depicts two additional facets of measures under SPC. First, the vertical coordinate is
a measure of how uniform the change to a given measure is under SPC as the underlying election
varies. In general, lower coefficients of variation are preferable. Second this figure summarizes
how dependent the results for each measure are on the structure of the SPC model. As shown by
the tight clustering for the declination and efficiency gap,24 these two measures are insensitive to
the implementation details of SPC. The clouds for partisan bias and mean-median difference show
there is a reasonable amount of dependency, yet these two measures do not do particularly well for
any of the SPCvariations.
One commonality between the efficiency gap and the declination is that they are averaging vote
shares over districts. This explains the stability for these measures illustrated in Figure 6 under
varying the redistribution algorithm. These measures are, of course, still sensitive to other features
such as the fraction of seats won by each party. Partisan bias and the mean-median difference are
more sensitive to what happens in specific districts; this feature appears to be responsible at least
in part to the lower success rates of these measures.
6. CONCLUSION
We have introduced simulated packing and cracking as a technique for examining how partisan-
gerrymandering measures respond to the type of vote-distribution modifications that occur in par-
tisan gerrymandering. Partisan bias and mean-median difference are unable to consistently record
simulated packing and cracking, even when restricted to competitive elections while the declination
and (by definition) the efficiency gap do well. As a result, we recommend that neither partisan bias
24Markers are jittered to reduce overlap.
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nor the mean-median difference be used for the “outlier” or “ensemble” method, where it is crucial
that more extreme values of the measure indicate more extreme levels of partisan gerrymandering.
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